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 Inescapable Issues Accountable in All Christians

 Integral Theology and Practice for Viable Faith in Everyday Life

 

 Chapter 5

   ISSUE 5:   How Our Person Functions

 

Sections

 

A Conscious Narrative
Conflicting Narratives
Variable Ontology and Function
Qualifying the Whole Person
Embodying Our Image or God’s

Introduction

Chap.1

Chap.2

Chap.3

Chap.4

Chap.5

Chap.6

Chap.7

Chap.8

Printable pdf 

(Entire study)

Table of Contents

 

Scripture Index

 

Bibliography

 

 

 

What are human beings…?

Psalm 8:4, cf. 144:3

 

“Let us create human being in our image, being human according to our likeness.”

Genesis 1:26

 

 

 

            The pivotal issue of listening that is essential for human interaction leads us directly into the most fundamental human dynamic underlying everyday life: How the human (our) person functions, which basically becomes the constitutive issue defining the extent of how the previous issues are perceived, addressed and concluded, as well as determining the extent of how the following issues will then function. Basic to Christians discussing this issue is the explicit or implicit theological anthropology (TA) that is constitutive for our existential practice—a theological anthropology working even unintentionally or unknowingly but nevertheless still determining for how our person functions. And this function in effect embeds Christian practice in a TA culture that is most influential in our identity formation and related values.

            Listening to our own stories about our person, and those of other persons both in our surrounding contexts and down through history, is a key interaction process for us to learn these essential functions: (1) how my person functions, (2) how other persons function, and (3) how God designed the person to function and thus wants, expects and holds accountable all persons to be.
            “Listen and learn” in this constitutive issue, which widens our ongoing challenge the most of all the issues discussed so far.

 

 

A Conscious Narrative

 

 

            Historically, in the question expressed at the top of the previous page, the psalmist deliberated about human being, and this further examined what is basic for the human person. This deliberation is familiar to all of us, and whether in our awareness or subconsciousness it has engaged us at one time or another—evoking conclusions, promoting theories and explanations, or provoking ambiguity, confusion, even despair. Whatever optimism or pessimism emerges from such deliberation, whatever hopes or limitations and insufficiencies result, all depend on the context locating the human being in question. This context composes the narrative of human being that shapes who emerges and what results. In other words, the nature and extent of this context(s) will define and determine the what and who of humans and, therefore, is critical to any discussion of human being and being human.

            In his deliberation, the ancient poet includes the Creator (“…that you are mindful of them”), but it is unclear whether the poet is merely enhancing his limited context or pointing beyond to a further and deeper context defining and determining human being (cf. 1 Chr 29:14; Ps 144:3). Others’ deliberations observe a physical context (without a creator) of millions of years to compose a material narrative of human being. Still others, unable to incorporate such an expansive context having no differentiation of design, purpose or meaning to distinguish the what and who of human being, turn to a more specific and often limited context to differentiate a unique narrative for humans, likely with a primary spiritual element (e.g. with the soul of dualism). Some attempt to reconcile the two positions in a somewhat hybrid narrative that differentiates the how and perhaps what of being human but not necessarily the who of human being (e.g. as does nonreductive physicalism). Each of the contexts locating the human being in question in these further deliberations composes either an incomplete or a fragmentary narrative, thereby rendering the what and who of human being incomplete and/or fragmentary.

            When I was growing up in Chicago (USA), I managed to attain a measure of academic and athletic success—having ascribed to me a label as “star” in my American football career. This happened despite my physical stature; I was always the smallest guy of the team, even more noticeable in the locker room at high school and college. I was not only physically small but being a racial minority (the only Asian American on the team and often the only one in classes) I was also physically different than the prevailing majority. So, I became self-conscious about my genes, yet I would be neither determined nor limited by those genes—at least in terms of being small.

            My experience illustrates and points to two vital ongoing issues for being human and human being. First, my being human was not limited to biology and determined by my body, though my physical action irrefutably played a major role on the football field (this wasn’t played out in my mind). From my physical context, limited strength and pain were a frequent source of feedback rendering me fearful and informing me not only that I can’t do this but shouldn’t—which my surrounding contexts (including my mom) reinforced in the constraining influence of culture. As my narrative illustrates, however, it is important to understand the influence of my will and the psychology of my mind (though not mind over matter), and how they interacted with my body to take me beyond any limitations of my genes, or to free me from self-imposed constraints and related cultural constraints shaped by my body (stereo)type. Some would interpret this interaction as the triumph of the soul/spirit over the body, espousing some form of dualism. Others opting out of dualism for a form of monism (as in nonreductive physicalism[1]) would advocate that this interaction demonstrates a higher level human function (notably the mind) having determining effect (if not cause) upon lower level human function (the body); this process is called supervenience, a quality (not a substance) in human being that is distinct from the body yet is inseparable from and interdependent with bodily function (namely the brain).[2]

            This leads to the second vital issue illustrated in my experience. No doubt my early experiences highlighted for me the benefits of prestige, along with related privilege and perhaps limited power or influence over others, which shaped my early life into adulthood. Yet, even though I wasn’t a Christian during most of this period (becoming a Christian at twenty), there was something stirring or even agitating within me that would expand the context composing my narrative. More important than the above, these experiences illuminated the reality of an increasing dissatisfaction I felt being treated on this basis. That is, rising within me was a distinct consciousness of this unsettled feeling: I never felt during this period that me (who and what I really am) was received and accepted apart from my successes. Indeed, even at an early age, I was suspicious of others’ positive attention and I distinctly wanted more in relationships. Unknowingly, I was exercising a naïve yet valid version of a ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’, both to deconstruct images as well as to search deeper for what my consciousness was pointing to and wanting to fully emerge: the person, the unique human person underlying all that I did and had, whose function eluded me.

            For physicalists rendered by determinism, the thoughts and feelings going on in my mind were not from a consciousness that can affect the behavior of our bodies but were a physically-caused experience known as an epiphenomenon (a phenomenon of physical cause having no other basis or effectiveness). Epiphenomenalism does not allow for consciousness to cause any further action to happen, no matter how real it seems and how strong the thought and deep the feeling. I don’t doubt that my consciousness is inseparable from my brain and depends on biology, but I have no basis to discount the interdependent nature of this reflexive relationship or to deny the causal role my consciousness had in changing how I saw my body and the person signified together with it. Accordingly, I consider epiphenomenalism to be a narrowed-down explanation of human life that renders epiphenomenon a reduction of human function.

            The underlying person being defined and determined on the basis of my abilities (what I have) and performance (what I do) unexpectedly emerged, but not surprisingly. This includes the realization that this was an inadequate and even unfair basis for who, what and how I am—the whole of my person that few recognized and affirmed, not even by my mother. How do I account for this emerging person? I say “unexpectedly emerged” since my social contexts and related cultural context did not advocate for this underlying person but, to the contrary, labored in and reinforced the prevailing human images shaped and constructed by what we do and have. Even had I been a Christian when my consciousness emerged, it would have been unexpected; my religious context most likely would have composed my narrative with the prevailing theological anthropology of reduced ontology and function—in other words, a religious context shaped by and thus embedded in surrounding human contexts. Accordingly, the underlying person emerging despite the limits and constraints of these contexts can only be unexpected, yet the emerging reality of such person is not surprising.

            I say that this emerging person is “not surprising” when, and only when, we pay attention and give priority (not in terms of total determination) to further and deeper contexts that can compose the narrative of human being beyond and more fully than prevailing contexts have up to the present. While acknowledging the provisional nature that all contexts must operate with, there are some contexts that take us deeper into the human narrative if we pay attention to them—pay attention not merely by observing behavior or monitoring brain activity. Paying attention, however, is not a simple process and may require some kind of wake-up call (cf. Mk 4:24; Rev 3:1-2); in addition, we may need a change in our perceptual-interpretive framework and lens in order not to ignore certain contexts integral for human being (cf. Lk 8:18; Rev 2:2-4). Therefore, whatever is needed in our response, it should be unmistakable that the contexts we pay attention to or ignore are consequential for defining and determining the what and who of human being.

            Human consciousness is one of those contextual areas of immediate interest that, on the one hand, has been widely interpreted while, on the other hand, has been given minimal attention to, that is, in terms of helping us understand our own person—if only by illuminating our unsettled condition or exposing our dissatisfaction. Yet, looking beyond the psychological context of the mind, the ambiguity of and the ambivalence about our own consciousness involves our need for whole understanding of human consciousness.

            There are two types of human consciousness that must be distinguished:

(1) consciousness of one’s person, and (2) consciousness of one’s self. The second type is self-consciousness focused on the outer in signified by reduced ontology and function, and thus is quantitatively oriented with any focus of ‘in’ not having much, if any, depth—demonstrated in my self-consciousness about my genes, which thankfully didn’t prevail in my narrative. The first type is person-consciousness focused on the inner out constituted by whole ontology and function, and thus is qualitatively-relationally oriented with the focus on ‘out’ fully embodied and inseparable from the ‘inner’. This vital focus

is demonstrated in my growing awareness of how I wanted and needed to be seen and treated as ‘person’, not as ‘self’—an ongoing process unfolding not without issues and struggles yet more deeply distinguished in its outcome for my person and my lens of others.

            What type of consciousness we pay attention to will determine both what and how we pay attention, and thereby define who will be the outcome. If you insert your personal story at this point, who is the person that you see and what do you learn about your person?

 

 

Conflicting Narratives

 

 

            An ongoing defining issue about human consciousness that must be understood and addressed accordingly unfolds as follows: Person-consciousness and self-consciousness are in ongoing tension, the process of which engages continuous contention with veiled conflict. If not adequately addressed and redefined by person-consciousness, self-consciousness will prevail over person-consciousness (even by default from the latter’s lack) and render it indistinguishable—most notably accomplished by functional illusion and ontological simulation to construct human life in fragmentary function of persons and their relationships.

            The two types of human consciousness and their respective processes are evident in the primordial garden. This context is jointly critical and pivotal for composing the narrative of human being from the beginning. Converging in the primordial garden are the various contexts that interact to compose a complete narrative of human being: the creation context, the evolutionary biology context, the psychological context of the mind, the relational context between Creator and humans, and humans with each other, all of which are integral for the context of human consciousness, and which are all subjected to, if not subject to, the ongoing contentious context of reductionism. Whether seen as historical or interpreted as allegorical, the primordial garden presents the most indispensable context and inescapable process that any significant deliberation of ‘what is human being’ must pay attention to necessarily and cannot ignore by necessity.

            The narrative of human being emerges in the beginning distinctly in the context of human consciousness. This integral process is also both critical and pivotal for defining and determining the what and who of human being along with the how of being human. I will highlight the human consciousness aspect of this narrative here, with further discussion below.

            In the creation narrative, the human male and female came before each other “naked and were not ashamed” (Gen 2:25). So, what’s so significant about this? From an evolutionary biology context animals have done this for millions of years; and such a natural outcome would be expected for Homo sapiens, so “what else is new,” that is, what is unique emerging? Well, nothing significant emerges if we remain within the limits of the physicalist’s composition of the human narrative that explains human changes from evolutionary adaptation. The reality, however, emerging along with and inseparable from the physical context cannot be ignored. Naked, yes, but not simply without any outer clothes, as the Hebrew term (‘arom) denotes. A physicalist-materialist’s lens pays attention to human being from outer-in and likely limits this male and female coming together to natural sex without shame. What such a lens (including some non-materialist and dualist lenses) overlooks or even ignores is human being from inner-out and the presence, for example, of human masks worn both to shield the whole of human being and to prevent being human from the depth level of connection necessary to distinguish their wholeness in relationship together—the created condition of all persons distinguished in the qualitative image and relational likeness of God. The innermost of human being is indispensable and irreplaceable to distinguish the person and persons together in relationship whole-ly from inner out.

            For this male and female to be naked and without shame involved a composition of the human narrative beyond the fragmenting terms of the body and marital sex between husband and wife. The Hebrew term for shame (bosh) involves confusion, disappointment, embarrassment or even dismay when things do not turn out as expected. What did they expect and what was their experience? Think about this male and female meeting on these terms for the first time and examining each other from the outer in. Obviously, our lens for beauty, femininity as well as masculinity shaped by culture would occupy our thoughts; likewise, perhaps, the competitive and survival needs from evolution could have shaped their lens. On what basis would there be no shame, confusion, disappointment, embarrassment or dismay? If what they saw of themselves from outer in were all there was and all they would get, it would not be difficult to imagine such feelings emerging.

            In deeper yet interrelated function, however, the lens of this male and female was not constrained to the outer in, and thus was not even limited to gender. Their connection emerged from the deep consciousness of human being from the inner out, the innermost of which can neither be adequately explained in physical terms nor even be sufficiently distinguished on the spiritual level. What we need to pay close attention to is the emergence of this human consciousness to compose the integral narrative for the conjoint whole of human being and being human. Most notably, the process of person-consciousness emerged to present the whole of human being without any masks or barriers (e.g. even the distinction of gender) in order to be involved with each other at the depth level necessary to distinguish their being human. In other words, the context of person-consciousness composes the human narrative in ‘naked and without shame’—the whole ontology and function necessary to distinguish the human person from merely common distinctions focused in self-consciousness.

            The human being-being human interaction is an essential process that must not elude Christian consciousness. It is helpful to reflect frequently first on “What existentially makes me human?” After reflecting specifically on your human being, then reflect on “How are you being that human in your everyday life?” Your two reflections directly interact either with consonance or dissonance, with congruence or incongruence. This process helps all Christians discern any simulations in human being and any illusions in being human, which often become too subtle to recognize without it.

            While person-consciousness is clearly distinguished, we cannot ignore the reality that it is ongoingly subjected to the ceaseless contentious context of reductionism. If this context is ignored or not adequately paid attention to, this becomes consequential for person-consciousness being subject to reductionism. This consequential condition is critical for any deliberation on what is human being, and its influence has been prevalent, if not prevailing, even to today in theological anthropology discourse. This consequence on human consciousness is also exposed in the primordial garden, as we witness a shift to “the eyes of both of them were opened and they realized they were naked…and made coverings for themselves” (Gen 3:7, NIV). This evolves to be covered not only with clothes but with titles, credentials, other personal resources, and covering up the person even with notions of gender. That is, “they put on a different perceptual-interpretive lens that focused on the outer in of human being, which narrowed their attention to the outer-in parts that now defined them, which then became the basis for determining their fragmentary engagement of each other embodied in the outer in of being human.” In this reality of being subjected to reductionism, person-consciousness made the consequential shift to self-consciousness, which could only compose the human narrative from outer in on the basis of reduced ontology and function.

            “Naked,” consequently, has a different meaning with a perceptual-interpretive framework and lens from outer in that fragments persons into parts and thereby reduces the significance of persons to their parts or the sum of those parts, which does not add up to be whole. Whereas “naked” from inner out is still seen as naked yet embodied in the wholeness of person, who and what is “not ashamed” (whatever the physical form) but affirmed and honored, and therefore not reduced in ontology and function as seen from outer in with self-consciousness. The latter involves shaping of humans subtly constructed by the functional illusion and ontological simulation of reductionism, whereby self is defined and determined by the primacy of one’s parts, that is, what one has (body, mind, soul) or does (namely in self-determination)—as evidenced above to compose the human narrative. In distinct contrast and even conflict, person-consciousness not only takes us to the depths of human being but also points beyond to that which distinguishes human uniqueness.

            The two types of human consciousness evidenced in the primordial garden is a critical distinction to understand in our deliberation of what is human. Moreover, this distinction is pivotal in theological anthropology discourse in terms of the following:

 

  1. The type of human consciousness used in the theological task will determine what composes the human narrative and who emerges.
     

  2. Which then defines the nature and extent of the epistemic field we will engage for the source of our knowledge and as the basis for our understanding.
     

  3. Whereby our conclusions of human being and being human can neither exceed nor be significant beyond any limits and constraints of the epistemic field we engage and the type of human consciousness used in our theological task.  

 

Therefore, we cannot ignore or minimize the importance of our human consciousness in order for theological anthropology to distinguish persons in whole ontology and function and not to render them fragmentary in reduced ontology and function. Such rendering (even with good intentions) is the basis of any unnecessary or even false dualism, and for material reductionism and related causal determinism.

            A related note about human consciousness is helpful to account for. Paying attention to human consciousness should not stop when we go to sleep (literally, not figuratively). Human consciousness does not cease during our sleep (as witnessed in brain activity) but in fact may become less encumbered to illuminate the state of our human being. That’s why dreams should not be ignored but examined. For example, a dream may highlight our self-consciousness to inform us of how embedded we are in reduced ontology and function. Ignoring or responding to such a dream can be pivotal to our human narrative and critical to opening us to person-consciousness (cf. 1 Sam 3; Dan 2ff; Acts 10:9ff). This raises a related question of whether human consciousness exists apart from the body (e.g. pointing to the soul), or when body parts are in crisis or don’t function. Both questions engage the fragmentation of human being into separate parts (namely, body and soul) or a reduction into a part without the necessity or at the exclusion of the other part. This is a common engagement that ceases to assume the integrity of the whole person by failing to account for the various contexts integral for human consciousness, that is, distinctly person-consciousness.[3]

            Furthermore, what we pay attention to in this human narrative from the beginning has added significance consequential for what is human being in the process of being human. Understanding the difference between “naked and without shame” (person-consciousness) and “seeing nakedness and covering up” (self-consciousness) is indispensable not only for what constitutes the vital nature of human life but, equally important, also for clearly illuminating the interrelated and inescapable matter of the human condition resulting from reductionism and its counter-relational work. The pervasive context of reductionism is an ongoing composing influence of the human narrative that must be paid close attention to in our deliberation and carefully accounted for in our discourse both in anthropology and theological anthropology. We cannot discuss or theorize about humans and their nature in the lab or in a vacuum isolated from everyday life (including our own), as if to assume the human condition is not an instrumental (if not causal) factor in defining and determining who, what and how humans are. Clarifying the connections underlying, we cannot ignore the human condition without fragmenting humans to the limits and constraints of reduced ontology and function (a clear indicator of self-consciousness).

            In other words, the human condition—in its various forms and expressions throughout human history, both individually and collectively, and likely subtle rather than extreme—signifies the outworking of human shaping and construction that skews, misleads and distorts the narrative of human being. Its implications inescapably involve consequences needing to be accounted for, decisively addressed and reconstituted in our deliberations and theological task, in order that in our human narrative the nature of human being emerges whole in the ontology and function necessary by that nature to define and determine the whole of who, what and how we are—nothing less and no substitutes. With anything less and any substitutes, our ontology and function fall into the human condition by default, which then evolve inevitably with simulations of our human being and illusions of our function in being human. This condition commonly composes too many Christian narratives.

            When the ancient poet deliberated on “what are human beings?” he specifically included the context of the Creator to compose the human narrative: “…that you are mindful of them…are relationally involved (paqad) with them.” How so?

            The question raised by the poet is focused more on the Creator than on human beings, though certainly he implies an interrelated structural condition and contextual process between them that he considers both definitive and conclusive. Accordingly, his question connects our deliberation back to the creation context—a context, of course, many don’t acknowledge but others don’t adequately utilize—composing the narrative focused on human being. In the creation context, the Creator declares about the human individual (even from inner out): “It is not good for this individual to be alone” (Gen 2:18, NIV), hereby enacting the Creator’s mindful and relational involvement with human beings.

            While only introducing this discussion now, we need to consider what is being composed here. “Good” (tob) can be situational, a moral condition, about happiness or being righteous; compare how good is perceived from human observation (Gen 3:6). When attached to “to be alone,” “not good” can easily be interpreted with all of the above, perhaps with difficulty about being righteous. Yet, in this creation context the Creator constituted the created human order, whose design, meaning and purpose are both definitive and conclusive for the narrative of human being and being human. Though the creation narrative is usually rendered “to be alone,” the Hebrew term (bad) can also be rendered “to be apart.” The latter rendering composes a deeper sense of relationship and not being fully connected to someone else, that is, not merely an individual having someone to associate with. This nuance is significant to pay attention to because it takes the human narrative beyond situations and deeper than the heterosexual relations of marriage. “To be apart” is not just a situational condition but most definitively a relational condition distinguished only by the primacy of the created human order. In the human narrative, a person may be alone in a situation but indeed also feel lonely (pointing to person-consciousness) in the company of others, at church, even in a family or marriage because of relational distance, that is, “being apart,” which the Creator defines as “not good.” How many feel lonely in the midst of all their so-called connections on social media?

            In the design, meaning and purpose of the created human order the human narrative is composed conjointly (1) for human being “to be part” of the interrelated structural condition and contextual process with the Creator, and (2) for the function of being human “to be part” of the relationship together necessary to be whole as constituted by and thus in the whole ontology and function of their Creator. “Good” (tob), then, in the creation context is only about being righteous (not about a moral condition but the relational function of an ontological condition); that is, good signifies the Creator’s whole ontology and function constituting the righteousness of God (defining the whole of who, what and how God is). In whole terms, only creator God is good—the difficult lesson Jesus illuminated for the rich young ruler about the primacy distinguishing human being and being human as his followers (Mk 10:18). And human beings are constituted in this “good,” in whole ontology and function in likeness of the righteous whole of who, what and how God is. Nothing less and no substitutes can constitute human beings as good, and any diminishment can only be “not good.” Therefore, anything less and any substitute is “to be apart” from this distinguished whole, rendering human being reduced and being human fragmentary.

            This summary context from the beginning composes the narrative with the ontology and function of human being and being human: For human beings, who are distinguished as persons, “to be apart is not ‘being who, what and how they are in their whole ontology and function that is constituted in the very likeness of the Creator’.” Your own story as a Christian may note the creation narrative in your belief references; but it may not get to the depths of the narrative and thus leave you in the condition “to be apart” without understanding this existing reality in your own story of human being and being human. If so, you are certainly not alone among Christians. Therefore, all Christians by necessity must give account of their existential ontology of human being and function of being human.

 

 

Variable Ontology and Function

 

 

            Human ontology and function is not a static condition, though it is certainly created whole in a definitive qualitative and relational condition that is not subject to a relative process of determination or emergence. Human ontology and function was created whole in the beginning. The issue from the beginning, however, is whether this ontology and function will continue to be whole by living whole. This outcome certainly was not predetermined, nor can we consider it our default condition and mode.

            To continue to be whole is a qualitative function of person-consciousness that focuses on the person from inner out, that is, on the whole person. Yet, the whole person is not a simple object operating within the parameters of a predetermined condition or behavioral pattern. Rather, contrary to some theories of the person, the whole person is a complex subject whose function includes human agency composed by one’s will that further distinguishes the person’s uniqueness created by God.

            Yet, a complex subject cannot be oversimplified in its human agency. A qualifier is raised by genetic limitations of brain function (e.g. mentally challenged), those suffering brain dysfunction (e.g. Alzheimer’s) and mind disorders that appear to lack human agency or lose human will—seemingly rendering them simple objects. This observation can only be made of a person from outer in; and any of its conclusions can neither account for variable ontology and function nor explain reduced ontology and function. While certain qualitative and relational functions may demonstrate a lack, if not appear lost, this involves the complexity of the human subject. The qualitative innermost constituting the uniqueness and human agency of the person functions integrally in the person as a whole, thus never separated from the body (whatever its condition), for example, in the spiritual substance of the soul, nor determined solely by the physical workings of the body. Regardless of any lack in the physical workings of the body, the qualitative innermost of the whole person still functions without being determined by the body and without being apart from the body in a separate function of the soul. How do we account for these persons then?

            The complex human subject is manifested in different outward forms, all of which cannot be explained. For example, any lack of physical capacity does not relegate a person to reduced ontology and function, though variable ontology and function is still possible for such a person. Each of these different forms, however, should not be perceived in the comparative process of prevailing human distinctions that compose a deficit model identifying those differences as less. This has obvious relational implications for those cultures and traditions that have favored certain persons (e.g. by race) and discriminate against others (e.g. by class, gender, age). Such practice is not only ethically and morally unacceptable for the global church (e.g. contrary to caste in India), but most important it exposes the sin as reductionism of persons embodying the church in reduced ontology and function.

            What is definitive of the complex human subject in any form is this reality: “It is not good to be apart” from the whole that God created for all human ontology and function in the qualitative image and relational likeness of God, and therefore any human subject can be affirmed and needs to be lived in whole ontology and function—even if conditions, situations and circumstances appear to the contrary, as it does for the persons discussed above. This challenges both our assumptions about persons who are different and how we define them and engage them in relationship. Any differences from our perceptual-interpretive lens that we impose on them reflect our reduced ontology and function, not theirs.

            As a complex subject in the human context, the human will is responsible for the perceptual-interpretive lens used to focus either inner out or outer in on the person, albeit with the influence of the surrounding context. Person-consciousness is intrinsic to being created whole but ongoing person-consciousness involves the person’s will. The person’s choice also can include using a lens focused on the person from outer in, which then shifts from person-consciousness to self-consciousness (as witnessed in the primordial garden). The vacillation between person-consciousness and self-consciousness is a reality of human agency that all persons assume by the function of their will, and that all persons are responsible for in living with whole ontology and function or reduced ontology and function—necessitating the careful and vulnerable examination of “Where are you?” and “what are you doing here?” And the further reality from the beginning needing to be understood is that self-consciousness and its lens of outer in have become the default choice. Unless this reality is addressed with the reality of human agency, the default mode will prevail in human consciousness and the perceptual-interpretive lens used. Moreover, this process of reality is nonnegotiable and thus is not amenable by a hybrid consciousness.

            Along with the lens used for the person and the human consciousness engaged, the human will is also responsible for the type of work engaged in. Given the reciprocal nature of whole relationships together, relational work is primary. How this work is perceived and the extent in which it is engaged—if it is perceived or engaged at all—unfold from the person’s will. For example, if the deliberate choice is not made to engage the primacy of relational work, secondary work becomes the primary focus either by intention or by default. In other words, the will is central to what ontology and function emerges from the person. That person and theological anthropology in use must be able to account for variable ontology and function. The soul of dualism and supervenience of nonreductive physicalism are insufficient to explain human agency and to define whole ontology and function. For example, the qualitative sensitivity and relational awareness of person-consciousness are not defined merely by a soul, nor is their lack explained by supervenience.

            Person-consciousness and the primacy of relational work are integral and thus inseparable for the whole ontology and function created by God. We cannot integrate person-consciousness with mere simple association with others, nor can we engage the primacy of relational work with self-consciousness. Person-consciousness is relational work, the primacy of which distinguishes the relational involvement of the whole person defined from inner out. The integral interaction between person-consciousness and relational work is both irreducible and nonnegotiable; and merely using the term relational in Christian vocabulary is both insufficient and misleading for a person’s function.

            Yet, from the beginning relational work has been further problematic for persons whenever a reductionist perceptual-interpretive lens misperceives God’s purpose for creating Eve and the significance of her relationship with Adam. These are vital issues necessary to include in TA discourse to understand what adds or subtracts in the relational equation of God’s created (original and new) design and purpose, particularly for relationships together constituting the church.[4] Critical to our deeper understanding of the purpose for Eve’s creation is the focus on the kind of work emphasized in the creation narrative. If you translate the Hebrew expression ‘ezer kenegdo as “a helper suitable for him” (Gen 2:18, NIV), thus interpreting the woman as an assistant or helpmate to the man (as gender complementarians do), then the focus is on the work in the primordial garden with the emphasis on “what they did.” Or if you translate it “a power [or strength] corresponding to man”[5] with the interpretation of Eve corresponding to Adam in every way, even “be his equal” (as gender egalitarians do), the focus can be on any type of work with the emphasis still on “what they do.” Both of these interpretations and perceptions minimize or even preclude the primacy of relational work, the nonnegotiable relational work in God’s design and purpose for relationships between persons distinguished by God’s qualitative image and relational likeness. This is the consequence because an emphasis on “what we do” reduces the qualitative focus of how we function in relationships in order to be whole merely to performing a role, even if that role is in a relational context.

            It is also not sufficient to say that Adam was lonely because he was living without community and needed a proper counterpart. Though these conditions existed, community and its formation connote different perceptions to persons, the very least of which may not even involve intimate relationships as understood in the community (communion) of the Trinity. Yet, God did not create Eve for Adam in order to have simply a collective dimension to life called community or a social context within which to do their living. This has deep implications notably for relationships together composing the church and the basis for constituting this gathering in distinguished terms from other gatherings in the human context. By necessity this is true for churches in both the global South and North, though the emphasis would be different in each sector.

            As signified by also being created in God’s image, Eve was created for the primacy of relationship, thus for the completion of the human relational context by which their persons (from inner out) could now involve themselves in the relational process constituted in the triune God and signified by both the qualitative image and relational likeness of whole-ly God. Without the completion of this relational context and process, a person(s) would “be apart”—a condition God defines as “not good” but which has been normative for the human condition and has become the norm for gatherings in the human context, even among Christians.

            Eve’s purpose was neither about working the primordial garden nor filling the earth, especially as we have come to define those purposes with the emphasis on “what we do.” These would be quantitative reductionist substitutes that redefine the person from the outer in—for example, according to roles and our performance. Even though Eve was created as a person in God’s image to complete the relational context and process, she was not immune to reductionism because she was free to redefine her person—the human agency of the will.  While making this choice does not change the created qualitative ontology of personness, it shifts that ontology to outer in and thereby reduces how the person functions and constrains what the person experiences, thus effectively constructing a personhood in the limits of human perception—an unfortunate consequence often seen in TA dialogue for practice.

             It would be a further reduction of Eve’s purpose, and thus an inaccurate interpretation, to perceive that women (gender and sexuality) were created primarily for specific relationships with men. That is to say, underlying Eve’s function to work is the purpose God gave her and Adam to “fill the earth” (Gen 1:28). Obviously, this then involved the created function of marriage (2:24) and procreation (3:20). Yet our deeper understanding of marriage and procreation for God’s purpose is also contingent on the kind of work emphasized in the creation narrative. If the work focused on is merely about making a living and extending it in raising a family (a dominant view), then our perceptions of marriage and family become reductionist (as previously noted about what we do) and our practice increasingly quantitative (as discussed about how we do relationships). This was not the purpose for Eve’s creation.

            In God’s purpose to “fill the earth” the term for “fill” (Heb. male) denotes completion of something that was unfinished. With this in mind we need to understand what God started in creation that Eve and Adam were to work for its completion. Did God just create a man and a woman, male and female, with work to do? Did God merely create the human species to be the dominant conclusion to all of creation? Or did God create whole persons in the very image of God’s being (constituted as the qualitative significance of heart) for the purpose of these persons having and building intimate relationships together in the likeness of the relational nature of God as constituted in the communion of the Trinity? The former emphasizes any secondary work engaged by persons in referential terms that fragment persons and relationships. The latter is focused only on persons engaged in the primacy of relational work that embodies the whole of these persons and their relationships together—the primacy that is never reduced in priority to any secondary work, even if such work may have importance.

            Reductionism turns God’s purpose to “fill the earth” quite simply into making children and the quantitative work of populating the earth. Likewise, perceptions of “be fruitful and multiply” become based on quantitative notions. If this were God’s purpose, the results such work had initially produced would have been partially acceptable, and God would not have started over with Noah and his family (Gen 6:1ff). But God’s purpose is qualitative; filling the earth is not about the numbers. What God started in creation was an extension of the triune God’s being and nature—not to be confused with pantheism. The person was created with the qualitative significance of God to have intimate reciprocal relationships with other persons, both of whom are undifferentiated (not reduced) by quantitative distinctions (such as gender or sexuality). Gender or sexuality does not distinguish the qualitative significance of human persons and relationships, though the whole person is certainly embodied in them irreducibly. This aspect of creation serves to illuminate in general the intimate relationships for which all persons are created, not to determine the ultimate context in which these intimate relationships can be experienced, that is, male-female relationships and marriage.

            When relational work is functionally established as God’s primary purpose for all persons, then the ontology and function of person-consciousness will not only emerge to be whole but also unfold to live whole in the human context. Person-consciousness and the primacy of relational work, as theological anthropology must account for, are ongoingly subjected to the prevailing influence of reductionism and its counter-relational work. Overtly yet subtly emerging from the beginning in the primordial garden, reductionism directed the shift away from person-consciousness and compromised the primacy of relational work. The integral relationship with God that constitutes the relational context and process of human life was fragmented by human will and the choice for self-determination, with the relational consequence “to be apart.”

            More emphatically, not only in relation to work but also in our relationships (especially with God) this condition “to be apart” underlies our reductionist tendencies, the substitutes we make in life and why we settle for less. In the human narrative, essentially every human activity since Adam and Eve’s human agency in self-determination has been to diminish, distort or deny the primacy of relationships in the created order. In the divine narrative, everything the Trinity has done is relational and is done to restore relationships to God’s original design and purpose. This created design and purpose is what Jesus came to restore us to—both with God and with others. Our TA and related doctrines need to reflect this coherence not only in our theology but most importantly for our practice. Without integral theology and practice, our faith has no basis to be viable in everyday life.

            As we reflect on creation and the relational context and process, we have to examine how we also “see” God and thus relate to this God. If we only see God as Creator, there can be a tendency to define God only by what God did—not only in the past but also the present, prompting “what have you done for me lately” (cf. Israel in the wilderness)—and, based on this lens, ignore God’s whole being. This is the result when our perceptual-interpretive lens is reductionist, primarily focused on the parts of what God does. To focus on and relate to God’s being is not only to engage the sovereign God (who commands) but also to be involved with the triune God (who is intimately relational in existential presence). On the basis of this whole-ly God, not parts of God, the relational process is constituted. Any other God is a reduction of the God of creation and the God of revelation vulnerably shared with us integrally whole and uncommon. Whichever God is perceived and engaged certainly has determining influence for theological anthropology; and this implication intensifies the need for our TA to address reductionism and its counter-relational work.

            In the narrative of Peter’s life (discussed previously) what evolved is important to learn from for our theology and practice. Peter’s variable ontology and function demonstrated two important issues for theological anthropology to integrate in its dialogue for practice:

 

  1. His person lived consistently, if not primarily, in the default mode of self-consciousness and its perceptual-interpretive lens from outer in, regardless of his good intentions (and referential confessions) to serve Jesus as his disciple, whereby his integral identity was diminished and his person-consciousness and relational work were minimalized.
     

  2. Peter’s will (no matter how committed and dedicated) was limited by the constraints of reductionism and, therefore, by itself was unable to constitute the redemptive change necessary to be and continue to live whole in ontology and function, consistently by nothing less than person-consciousness and no substitutes for the primacy of relational work.

 

            Whole ontology and function is always subjected to reductionism and its counter-relational work—ongoingly both overt and subtle. To continue to live whole becomes a struggle when qualitative sensitivity to reductionism and relational awareness of its counter-relational work are lacking in the person to expose its influence. Variable ontology and function results when any person’s integral identity is diminished and their person-consciousness and relational work are minimalized. Therefore, in the human context what is clearly evident from the beginning for any theological discourse on human persons is to establish a strong view of sin: that is, a definitive view of sin as reductionism—not merely as moral and ethical failure—which provides the understanding needed to expose the reductionism of sin prevailing in the human context that composes the human relational condition “to be apart” from the whole, God’s qualitative relational whole and the whole-ly God. A critical part of distinguishing the person in complete context is to address the influence of reductionism in the person’s surrounding context. To ignore the presence of reductionism and to not pay attention to its influence in the surrounding context are indicators that theological discourse about persons has already been shaped by this influence.

            For example, in contexts where honor-shame are more determining for practice than ethical and moral views (with focus on innocence-guilt), honor-shame would expand our view of sin with a more collective-relational emphasis. Yet, such a collective-relational concern would most likely be engaged merely in referential terms and not be involved by God’s whole relational terms (as in the primordial garden, Gen 2:25). On such a limited basis, honor-shame becomes a self-concern centered on self-consciousness that still continues in reduced ontology and function. Honor-shame, then, subtly extends sin without reductionism, or a weak view of sin This is of utmost importance for global South Christians in particular to understand and not to be influenced to shape their view of sin.

            Anything less than a strong view of sin and any substitutes for sin as reductionism render persons to reduced ontology and function, unable to consistently live whole ontology and function into the human context. Without understanding sin as reductionism, the distinction between self-consciousness and person-consciousness is erased from human consciousness. In this common condition, persons and relationships are always limited to and constrained by an inescapable default condition and mode—the prevailing alternative to the person simply centered in self-consciousness.

            There is an irony, and perhaps paradox, to TA’s view of sin. On the one hand, a weak view of sin (not composed as reductionism) signifies for soteriology that a human person is only saved from sin in what is, at best, a truncated soteriology. This incomplete salvation does not result in whole ontology and function for the person no matter how much sin the person is saved from. On the other hand, the strong view of sin as reductionism requires of soteriology that a human person is not only saved from the sin of reductionism, but by the nature of being redeemed from reduced ontology and function the person is conjointly saved to whole ontology and function in a complete soteriology. A truncated soteriology is fragmentary, which cannot make a person whole but only saves them from sin without reductionism. A complete soteriology by definition includes to be made whole; in other words, a person is never saved from being reduced (or “to be apart”) until the person is also saved to being whole. Salvation is always incomplete and remains fragmentary without this integral salvific process. This is the gospel that unfolded with the embodied whole of Jesus and also emerged with the relational Word from the beginning—the gospel that constitutes the person in theological anthropology (composed whole, not reduced) to be and live whole ontology and function into the human context.

 

 

Qualifying the Whole Person

 

 

            “To be apart” signifies the human condition that prevails in the human narrative—a condition that must be accounted for in our deliberation of human being as well as accounted for in the human consciousness we use, in the methodology we employ and in the epistemic field we engage during the course of our function of being human.

            In human consciousness (both self-consciousness and person-consciousness) no human (and few animals) wants “to be apart”, that is, assuming we don’t ignore it and pay attention. Yet, the matter of “to be apart” includes anything less and any substitutes of the whole distinguished in God’s being and created by God in human being. This raises the question of how definitive and conclusive is this whole for human being and being human; and how can this whole be distinguished from any human shaping or construction? These are urgent questions needing to be addressed for qualifying the complete context from the beginning—which includes the primordial garden and its pivotal dynamic—that is requisite to compose the narrative of human beings in wholeness. If nothing less and no substitutes but this whole has no basis of significance, then anything less and any substitutes will be sufficient in our deliberation, even in the absence of mutual agreement (any level of consensus) or personal satisfaction.

            At this point, a broader grasp of contextual issues will deepen our understanding. Both the creation context introduced above and the well-established context of evolutionary biology point to a cosmological context. The cosmological question about ‘in the beginning’ revolves around whether the human narrative is composed merely by physics or also beyond physicality, even beyond common notions of metaphysics. The idea of truth and what can be accepted as true have been formed by the knowledge of what exists in the universe in general and in human life in particular, though this epistemological engagement and related conclusions historically have been also shaped by a limited worldview (interpretive framework), cultural constraints (interpretive lens) and even by individual agenda (e.g. a growing problem in the scientific community demonstrated by those seeking stature).[6]  Supposedly, then, a valid definition of truth is determined only by what is. Yet, given the contextual issues that influence the formation and shape of what is true, the rhetorical question that Pilate raised to Jesus warrants further attention in our cosmological context and demands qualifying response for theological anthropology: “What is truth?” (Jn 18:38). Perhaps with the mis(dis)information composing so much so-called truth today, even among Christians, few would be willing to go further and deeper.

            Our level of confidence in the knowledge we possess and use—interrelated knowledge for the universe and human life—is by its nature and must be in its practice contingent on two irreplaceable issues:

 

  1. The source of our knowledge that both defines its significance and determines its scope beyond the limits and constraints of a narrowed-down epistemic field shaped by what is only self-referencing.[7]
     

  2. A complete epistemic process—provisional in its knowledge and heuristic in its development—engaged by a non-fragmented interpretive framework and non-fragmenting interpretive lens that can address any fragmentation in order that any pieces/parts can be put together (syniemi, cf. Mk 8:17-21), not in sum total but in integral relationship together, whereby this epistemic process illuminates the whole necessary for our knowledge and understanding to have integrated significance to distinguish it beyond mere self-referencing, that is, that context of reductionism constrained to human shaping and construction (even of God, Ps 50:21).

 

            Obviously in today’s climate, many have illusory confidence in their knowledge. In their bias, they have a hard time recognizing, for example, existing disparities in human life, and thus they would resist or deny the existential truths of these human conditions. Psychologists refer to this kind of broad bias in perception as “motivated cognition”: the skewed mindset engaged in mental actions that ignore, discount or downplay contradictory evidence in order to maintain coherence between their beliefs and reality. Do you see any of this today? In the U.S. the Republican Party is currently dealing with this in its evolving position on former president Trump.

            All affirmations, assertions and definitive statements of knowledge must give account of their source and, equally important, must account for how they relate to this source in the epistemic process. Clearly, we cannot and should not expect to experience resulting knowledge and to form conclusions of what is true beyond what our source, interpretive framework and lens allow. This necessarily applies to any theological engagement and any aspect of the theological task in anthropology, not as an obligatory methodology (e.g. for certainty or to be spiritually correct) but due to the pervasive and prevailing context of the epistemological, hermeneutical, ontological and relational influences of reductionism. In this context of reductionism, the reality of what is that determines the definition of truth becomes composed by epistemological illusion and ontological simulation for what ought to “be” in human life and function—as in the primordial garden, “you will not be reduced…you will be like God” (Gen 3:4-5).

            This composition is commonly seen in the ‘naturalistic fallacy’, which consists in identifying what is with what ought to “be”. This not only misleads the epistemic process but distorts it, thereby imposing limits and constraints on both the extent and validity of knowledge resulting. Moreover, such limited or constrained knowledge consistently confuses what is with self-referential notions of what ought to “be”, all emerging from a fragmentary interpretive framework and lens that unfolded from the primordial garden (“…your eyes will be opened,” Gen 3:5). This epistemic dynamic exists today in theological anthropology discourse, evident in dualism and even nonreductive physicalism.

            In the cosmological context, all knowledge is rendered provisional, though not necessarily relative or evolving. This has been an ongoing practice in physical science, for example, leading to new discoveries about the universe (now also considered a multi-verse). Yet, such practice has often not realized the underlying engagement exercised in this heuristic process; nor has it likely understood the direct correlation in the heuristic process between the knowledge available for discovery and the extent of its epistemic field. Here again, cosmology evidenced a major breakthrough in the heuristic process when its epistemic field shifted from a geocentric model to a heliocentric model of the universe. The cosmological context, however, continues to be the critical issue ‘in the beginning’ (creation) and indeed pivotal ‘from the beginning’ (what has evolved), involving the epistemic field composing the human narrative and any related limits or constraints on the heuristic process defining human being and determining being human.

            Some of these limits or constraints perhaps could be found in the world of neuroscience. Iain McGilchrist locates these heuristic and epistemic processes in the brain activity apparently of the right and left hemispheres. He concludes that each brain hemisphere represents different views of the world. The left hemisphere, for example, looks at parts or fragments and then makes generalized abstraction, aggregated from the parts. It is the special capacity of the left hemisphere to derive generalities—the dominant function characteristic of scientists—but these generalities have nothing to do with wholes because, as McGilchrist rightly notes, they are in fact necessarily built from parts, aspects, fragments of existing things within the universe; these things in themselves could never have been generalized. This knowledge gained from putting things together from bits—the knowledge called facts—is the only kind of knowledge permitted by science (at least in theory if not always in practice). Yet, this resultant sought-after “certainty,” on which the left hemisphere concentrates in its need to be right, is also related to narrowness, with the effect that the more certain we become of something the less we see (perhaps like narrow-minded). Consequently, this knowledge, with its left hemisphere function, does not provide a good idea of the whole, but, at best, just a partial reconstruction of aspects of the whole.[8] And how we use this knowledge, and its underlying assumptions, may not only indicate perhaps the dominance of the left hemisphere but also will critically determine the breadth and depth of our perspective of the world and all who live in it.

            With the provisional nature of knowledge, there is a certain degree of humility needed to openly engage the epistemic process without predetermining what can or cannot result. Epistemic humility minimizes being so predisposed. For engagement in the epistemic process to be unrestricted in its heuristic purpose and function, thus leading to any further knowledge and deeper understanding, there are distinct assumptions that need to be made. To hold to assumptions, to employ any assumptions, is to exercise a level of faith—which even scientists do, often without direct acknowledgement or clear realization. This does not involve a shift from rationalized thinking (as in science) to faith as faith is often perceived without any valid basis other than a believer’s own supposition (even presupposition). To exercise faith is the function of trust extended necessarily to our epistemic field and the epistemic process in order to establish our level of confidence in any resulting knowledge; the practice of faith/trust varies but nevertheless is required and operative to engage a heuristic epistemic process. In no other area of knowledge is this more necessary than anthropology and understanding the nature of human being and the function of being human, the whole of the human person.

            For the epistemic process in our deliberation of human beings to develop, the process must by its nature be heuristic. Yet, this heuristic epistemic process does not and is unable to go beyond its epistemic field; that is, it is distinctly limited and constrained to the extent of its epistemic field, no matter how much faith is exercised. Therefore, both science and theology are unable to explain, define and determine human beings any further than the knowledge available to them in their epistemology. This discussion consistently challenges our epistemic field and the interpretive framework and lens used for what we pay attention to and/or ignore in the epistemic process.

            This brings us back to the cosmological question of how the human narrative is composed. Science and its knowledge are engaged in a heuristic process that, arguably, both exposes their limits and also inadvertently points to the source (cf. Rom 1:20) that takes them beyond those limits to the whole knowledge and understanding of reality and life—what is and not just what ought to “be”. The provisional nature of knowledge also reveals the fragmentary condition of what can be observed, whether in the universe (even now with the Webb telescope) or in human life, with only parts to work with and attempt to piece together for an elusive whole. This fact reveals the basic reality of life: the whole cannot be achieved from mere parts (whatever their quantity or sum total); wholeness can neither be understood nor experienced from things which/who are only fragmentary.

            The heuristic process of science, when engaged honestly and openly (a mistake to merely assume), acts just as Paul said the law in Judaism works to expose our limits and point us to the source of whole life (Gal 3:19,24). Likewise, Paul clearly distinguished that this law should not be the primary determinant of human function, which speaks to related parts in theology used misguidedly to construct the whole. Given their limits—and yet their rightful place and role in human life that should not be disregarded but affirmed for their heuristic purpose—science and adherence to the law (both of nature and of God) cannot be the primary source of self-understanding to determine human beings and construct human identity. Emerging from provisional knowledge within a limited epistemic field, such self-determination is merely self-referencing and cannot go beyond the limitations of human resources, even weakness and imperfection; nor can it adequately account for these limits in its knowledge and understanding of life, thus rendering human ontology and function to illusion and simulation (“and you will be like God,” Gen 3:5).

            This makes evident a further step of vulnerability critical for human engagement: both epistemic as well as ontological humility are necessary in order for science and the law to engage the heuristic function of their nature, namely pointing to the source beyond human contextualization. To remain within the limits of human contextualization is to be susceptibly subjected to, and likely become subject to, the ongoing defining and determining influences of reductionism.

            Theology by definition should “take us” beyond human contextualization, that is, not merely point us or lead us beyond in heuristic function but to distinguish indeed that source beyond—which/who is clearly the Subject of theology, theological engagement and the theological task. Yet, the theological task often has been rendered to mere human contextualization, either by design (e.g. natural theology, liberalism) or by default (e.g. much of evangelicalism). This is most evident in theological anthropology.

            Knowledge and understanding of God depend foremost on their primary source, whose context by nature is beyond human contextualization. Furthermore, our interpretation of this source beyond must emerge from the interpretive framework compatible with this source in order for our knowledge and understanding of God to be congruent with the source distinguished from beyond. Certainly, if this source beyond is inaccessible, compatibility and congruence are irrelevant. Of course, if such an improbable source can have no valid basis for existing, then the burden is upon, for example, the scientific community to explain how and why its narrow epistemic field of probability can eliminate, discount or ignore the improbable in the heuristic process. Anthropology can be sustained in the limited epistemic field of physicality, yet what survives of human being in this context cannot be of significance for the human person. Conversely, theological anthropology cannot survive with only a limited epistemic field, yet even from such limits conventional TA, historically, has often sustained notions of human being that have little or no significance to the human person and the Creator. Knowledge and understanding of human beings are rooted in knowledge and understanding of their Creator; and the context composing the former is contingent on the context constituting the latter (cf. Jer 9:23-24; Jn 14:9; 17:3).

            We cannot underestimate the importance vested ‘in the beginning’ for our understanding the whole as well as our need to be whole. And we can neither allow this to be diminished by science nor minimalized by philosophy as well as theology. Essentially, its importance involves no less than the search for identity, human identity, not in social terms but in primary terms of creation. Accordingly, this identity is inseparable from the identity of the Creator outside the universe, whose intrusive action set in motion the relational dynamic that holds the cosmos together in its innermost in the beginning, ongoingly from the beginning, to and through the end. The whole—in which human identity is defined and by which it is determined—constitutes the identity of God, the whole of whose creative action composes the universe and all in it.

            This created whole, however, was sadly fragmented by reductionism—the contrary of wholeness—making necessary the whole-ly God’s salvific action to transform human being and thus all creation to be whole. Nothing less than this identity can be whole, and any substitute for this whole identity is only shaped by reductionism. This reductionism and its counter-relational work are consequential for the fragmentation of life constituting the human condition, not in the beginning but from the beginning—as demonstrated in the primordial garden (Gen 3:1-7). Therefore, the search for identity has had a long history of human shaping and construction; underlying this history is the shift of ontology from inner out to outer in, and thereby the shift in function from qualitative to quantitative (cf. Gen 2:25 and 3:7). And, most certainly, this shift has restricted the epistemic process to limited (narrowed-down and fragmentary) knowledge and loads of information. Moreover, it has prevented the involvement necessary to go further and deeper in the epistemic process for whole knowledge and understanding.[9]

            Theological anthropology can only survive when the context of its source unmistakably distinguishes the Creator as Subject to compose the human narrative beyond the limits of physicality and conventional metaphysics. Theological anthropology becomes significant for the human person when the improbable theological trajectory of the Creator relationally intrudes the human context in order to clearly distinguish what is the nature of human being and the function of being human. When the epistemic field for theological anthropology incorporates this relational context and process, it also shifts the specific direction of our hermeneutical methodology: “to interpret nature in the light of grace and not the other way round,” as Alan Torrance observes for theological anthropology. Its direction, he continues, “must think from God to humanity and not from our prevailing conception of humanity (and those facets of it deemed to be significant either by science or culture) to the transcendent.” We can add in this respect that the theological task must be able to distinguish theological anthropology from anthropological theology (as sustained above). Torrance draws this conclusion:

 

If theology is not to offer crude divine ratification of our prevailing scientific hypotheses and cultural affiliations, then God’s self-disclosure at the heart of the Christian faith must be given a foundational and not a derivative role in the business of determining what it is to be human. The decision not to begin there inevitably amounts to a decision not to arrive there! What I am suggesting, therefore, is that the knowledge intrinsic to faith supplies the fundamental ontological categories with which to approach theological anthropology and cannot leave it to science, psychology, or philosophy to provide these. To refuse to operate in this manner amounts to a de facto denial either that God has given himself to be known in revelation or that God’s self-revelation has any fundamental bearing on the interpretation of the shape and function of human existence.[10]

 

            This brings us face to Face with the creation context and the cosmological question “Did God really say that?” (Gen 3:1, NIV). My basic assumption of faith about ‘what are human beings’ is that this living entity is a creature with a creator—without discounting the context of evolutionary biology but also not being limited to it or constrained by its pervasive thinking. My functional trust, extended in the epistemic process, arrives at the heuristic outcome that this creator is God based on direct relational self-disclosure; and this Creator-God has also revealed the knowledge and understanding of the human person necessary in order to be definitive for theological anthropology to be complete, that is, whole in ontology and function and thus conclusive of its relational design, purpose and outcome.

            When the context composing the narrative of human being and being human is complete, both the human person is illuminated to emerge whole and the human condition is exposed in its fragmentation “to be apart” from the whole. This can be summarized as follows:

 

The human person (conjointly inseparable individually and corporately) is constituted in the relational context of the whole of God (or the trinitarian relational context of family) in which the human person emerges whole-ly by the relational process of the whole of God (i.e. the trinitarian relational process of family love). Apart from God’s relational context and process, the epistemic field for human existence is narrowed down to quantitative terms, observing human life from outer in that can only be self-referencing—given the scope of its epistemic field and process—thereby fragmenting human existence into parts and rendering the human person incomplete, that is, reduced in ontology and function, and thus signifying the human condition “not good to be apart from the whole.” The whole of God—who has also been theologically fragmented into parts, consequently obscuring the whole ontology and function distinguishing God—and God’s relational context and process are irreplaceable for distinguishing the nature of human being, and therefore are irreducible and nonnegotiable for constituting being human only as persons in the image and likeness of God’s whole ontology and function. Nothing less and no substitutes.

 

            This critical relational context and process were established in the primordial garden, which the context of reductionism then renegotiated and reduced to fragment human persons to the outer in of reduced ontology and function. That was pivotal for what composed the human narrative—partial context or complete context. And understanding these contexts remain critical and pivotal for the epistemic process of theological anthropology, and therefore for the existential practice of what are human beings.

 

 

Embodying Our Image or God’s

 

 

            As this constitutive issue widens the challenge for all our persons and narrows the path for each person, nothing is more constitutive for the human being we become and thus the being human we are in everyday life than the image of the person we embody. This is illustrated in Job’s narrative, whose experience we can also learn from for our own narrative.

            In his frustration or cynicism, and perhaps despair, Job initially raised the same question as the psalmist from a different approach: “What are human beings that you make such a big deal (gadal) of them, that you even set your heart (leb) on them and are involved (paqad) with them every day…all the time?” (Job 7:17-18) What provoked Job’s question specifically involved his own person in God’s context, which obviously seem to contradict his current trauma.

            First, Job experienced being the object of Satan’s reductionism to define his person by what he had and did (Job 1:10-11). Initially. Job would not let his person be defined in those reduced terms (1:20-22). But then, Job’s focus on his person shifted from inner out (2:3) to outer in (2:4-5). When he also made the outer in primary, he was conflicted in person-consciousness and became self-conscious in his context with God (e.g. 10:1; 27:2). What unfolded is critical to the process of theological anthropology and basic to what and who constitute the person in God’s context.

            To answer his question about the person in God’s context, Job narrowed his epistemic field (e.g. 23:3, 8-9) in order to explain his person from outer in, and why this was happening to his person in God’s context. What Job experienced was a struggle common to all persons in God’s context: the vacillation between inner out and outer in (19:26-27)—also between person-consciousness and self-consciousness; and the confusion such preoccupation in the outer in creates (19:19; 27:2; 29:2-5). In the midst of this struggle, Job’s will remained focused on the primacy of relationship with God (2:9-10), even though his person-consciousness waned. His primary focus was the key that allowed him to receive feedback to his answers—answers which begged the question from God (38:2)—in order to engage the relational epistemic process with God for the heuristic function to know and understand his (including our) whole person in God’s context. This process and the relational outcome are fundamental for theological anthropology, Job’s and ours as well.

            In God’s response to Job (38-41), God takes Job’s epistemic field beyond the human context to establish the person unequivocally in God’s context, that is, the complete context necessary to compose the narrative for human being in whole ontology and being human in whole function (as in 38:36). Therefore, in Job’s assumptions about the person in God’s context, he realized his speculation was based on a narrow epistemic field and its hermeneutic limits (40:5); whereby he received God’s direct relational response in this relational epistemic process (42:4-5) that provided Job with the epistemological clarification and hermeneutic correction needed for whole knowledge and understanding contrary to his fragmentary knowledge and understanding (42:3). This relational outcome can only be experienced in the primacy of relationship with God in both epistemic and ontological humility. Thus, Job learned a critical lesson in being apart from God’s relational context and relational epistemic process:

 

Anything less than and any substitutes for the whole signify theological anthropology discourse that “obscures (hashak) God’s plan and purpose (‘esah) for the human person with words without whole knowledge and understanding” (da’at, 38:2); this is the reductionist result of attempting “to explain (nāgad) the person in God’s context I did not understand, the person too distinguished (pala) for me to know from a limited epistemic field and narrow perceptual-interpretive lens” (42:3).

 

            The heuristic process does not and cannot go beyond its epistemic field. So, for example, both science and theology cannot explain, define and determine the human person any further than the knowledge available to them in their epistemology—though obviously this hasn’t stopped speculative discourse from speaking about and even for God (sound familiar?). As we deliberate on the person in God’s context, we need to learn from Job. He experienced ontological struggle when he focused on his outer in, which thereby led to relational difficulty in reciprocal relationship with God. On the one hand, Job shared his feelings openly with God but then, on the other hand, he spoke for God on his own terms; and the latter involved both an epistemological and hermeneutical problem. The ontological, relational, epistemological and hermeneutical issues are critical for our knowledge and understanding of the whole person distinguished in God’s context.

            As Job discovered humbly and thus vulnerably, persons in God’s context cannot negotiate either the qualitative condition of their ontology or the relational terms of their function. Any theological anthropology discourse must be engaged accordingly in order to get to the heart of human being and the depth of being human. For example, when discussing the social nature and character of human persons, it is insufficient for TA to talk about merely social relatedness and community to define and distinguish the human person. For nonnegotiated theological anthropology, the person is created in the qualitative image of God to function in relational likeness to the whole of God (discussed shortly). Without renegotiation, therefore, human persons are created in whole ontology and function for the primacy of relationship together solely in whole relational terms as follows:

 

The qualitative ontology of the person’s heart vulnerably opens to the hearts of other persons (including God) in order for the relational outcome of the primacy of relationship together to be nonnegotiably and irreducibly distinguished by the wholeness of intimate relationships—defined as hearts open and vulnerably connected together to be whole, that is, whole solely in the image and likeness of the whole of God (“not to be apart…but naked and relationally connected without disappointment”).

 

It is an open question whether Christians have discovered this and thus experience its relational reality.

            In contrast and conflict, when God’s relational terms from inner out are shifted to referential terms from outer in (even unintentionally or perhaps inadvertently), something less or some substitute replaces the above and renders the person and relationships to fragmentary-reduced ontology and function without the primacy of the qualitative (with the function of the heart) and the relational (in intimate relationships of wholeness). This qualitative and relational consequence no longer distinguishes persons in God’s context, only shapes them in the limits of the human context by the constraints of the human condition (“to be apart…naked and relationally distant”). This is the human image constitutive of the human being and being human that commonly embodies persons.

            The diversity of human images prevailing in the human context to constitute the person that we could embody is inescapable. If we don’t understand God’s image beyond an association for our theology and practice, we are highly susceptible to embodying a human image for our person. In that state, like Job, we would be confronted with God’s question “Who is this person that functions without knowing?”

            Definitively what was created and why are contingent on the whole ontology and function of God, and therefore contingent on the Word in the beginning, in whose image human being is created to be whole and in whose likeness all human ontology and function are created to live whole—to be and live whole together in relationship with the whole of God and God’s creation (Gen 2:18,25, cf. Rom 8:17,19). The whole illuminated was not a product of some dialectic or abstract process; it was the relational outcome in the beginning of the whole-ly God’s communicative-creative action. This uncommon whole emerged only with the Whole from outside the universe to constitute the whole of the universe and all in it in the innermost (Col 1:17). Moreover, the Whole does not become the universe (pantheism), nor is the universe all there is of the Whole (as in panentheism). The whole-ly God (the triune God) remains distinguished outside the universe and this Whole’s likeness distinguishes the universe in the innermost to be whole—the innermost otherwise elusive to the human perceptual-interpretive lens. Though this wholeness was the reality in the beginning, reductionism clouded the human lens to fragment the whole of human ontology and function, and also creation (Gen 3:7,10,17; cf. Rom 8:19-21). The good news, however, is the deeper unfolding of the Word to give the light to the innermost necessary to be whole, “who has shone in our hearts…” (2 Cor 4:6).

            For Paul, there is definitive epistemological clarification in “the knowledge of the glory of the whole of God vulnerably revealed by the face of Christ as the image of God” (2 Cor 4:6, cf.v.4). ‘Glory’ illuminates the being, nature and presence of God (as Moses requested, Ex 33:18), which reveals the qualitative heart of God’s being, God’s intimate relational nature and vulnerable presence (cf. Jn 17:22,24). The whole of Jesus magnified the heart of God’s being, relational nature and vulnerable presence in the human context by embodying an improbable theological trajectory and intrusive relational path (Jn 1:14,18). The whole gospel illuminates this glory magnified in Christ as the image of God (2 Cor 4:4, cf. Col 1:15). From Paul’s first encounter with Christ, he experienced this glory in relational terms.

            The glory and image of God in the face of Christ disclosed in the incarnation are primary to the complex theological dynamics composing Paul’s complete Christology. These dynamics illuminate the glory and image of God beyond their understanding in Judaism and further and deeper than in the Jesus tradition. In the OT, the image of God’s glory is mainly characterized as strength and power (e.g. Ex 15:6,11; 16:6-8; Ps 24:7-10; 29:1-9; 59:9,17). The incarnation, however, deepens this image and glory of God to illuminate the qualitative heart, relational nature and vulnerable presence of God relationally disclosed by the whole of Jesus only for involvement in relationship together. This strategic shift did not exclude God’s strength and power (as demonstrated by the resurrection) but presupposes God’s reign (notably over darkness and now over death). On this basis, this strategic shift in Jesus’ intrusive relational path fully focuses on God’s relational response of grace whole-ly extended within the innermost of the human condition—that is, not merely in its situations and circumstances but more importantly to the persons who are apart from the whole of God’s wholeness, in order to reconcile them to the relationship necessary to be whole together. This relational outcome can only emerge from the function of relationship, and the incarnation constitutes only this function.

            As the function of relationship, nothing happens without the experiential truth from the incarnation embodying the relational dynamic of the image and glory of God, not the conceptual image or doctrinal glory of God. The Jesus tradition rightly understood this relational outcome as only from God’s grace yet did not fully understand the theological dynamics involved or the theological anthropology necessarily engaged. This gap was demonstrated at a church summit in Jerusalem (Acts 15:1-29) and by Peter’s interpretive framework and lens prior (10:9-16, 34-36), for which Paul later still had to give hermeneutic correction to Peter’s practice for the experiential truth of the whole gospel embodied by Jesus (Gal 2:14).

            In the incarnation of God’s relational dynamic determined only by the relational function of grace, Jesus fulfills the whole of God’s thematic relational response to the inherent human relational need and problem (which neuroscience rightly identifies). By fulfilling God’s relational response only in the dynamic of nothing less and no substitutes, Jesus embodied the wholeness of the image of God (eikon, Col 1:15). Eikon implies not merely a resemblance to but the total correspondence and likeness of its archetype, here the invisible God—just as Jesus claimed to his first disciples (Jn 14:9). The eikon of God is made definitive by the illumination (photismos) of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, whose vulnerable embodiment made God’s qualitative being and relational nature functionally involved with persons for experiential truth in relationship together (2 Cor 4:4b,6).

            Beginning with his face-to-Face encounter with Jesus on the Damascus road, Paul experienced directly this relational dynamic of Christ's illumination now extended also to him. In this relational process with Jesus, God's relational function of grace and its outcome of intimate relational connection together (not mysticism) provided Paul with his ongoing experiential truth of the glory of God “in Christ”, the image of God. All this was to definitively establish for the church at Corinth “by the open statement of truth” (phanerosis from phaneroo, 4:2) that the relational dynamic is from God and not from human shaping (4:1). For Paul, the image of God was unmistakable in the relational dynamic of Christ’s magnification of God’s glory, which Paul simply integrates in “the gospel of the glory of Christ” (4:4b).

            This relational dynamic of the image and glory of God is essential for Paul’s pleroma Christology (completeness, fullness, whole, Col 1:19; 2:9) because it signifies the whole of Jesus’ person vulnerably embodied, magnified and involved for relationship together, fulfilling the following three functions unique to the face of Christ:

 

  1. Whole knowledge and understanding of the whole of God’s ontology as nothing less and no substitutes of God’s qualitative being and relational nature (Christ the epistemological-theological key).

 

  1. Whole knowledge and understanding of the whole of God’s function in the relational context and process constituted only by God’s relational terms of grace (Christ the hermeneutical key).

 

            This relational dynamic of the image and glory of God in Christ functions also to illuminate the whole knowledge and understanding of the face of Christ’s function from inner out in God’s relational context and process, whereby to function congruent to only God’s relational terms of grace from top down. Christ’s face and function together are irreducible and therefore indispensable for Christology to be complete. In Paul's pleroma Christology, Christ's face and function constitute the whole person vulnerably involved in relationship. The relational outcome, in contrast to the relational consequence above, is that the whole of God is now accessible for intimate relationship Face to face. The relational implication is that the function of this distinguished Face is compatible only with the human face in qualitative image and relational likeness of his for the qualitative-relational connection and involvement necessary to be whole-ly Face to face to Face. These essential dynamics unfold just by God’s relational terms from top down, thus they cannot unfold shaped from bottom up by human terms.

            This relational outcome is the purpose and function of the unequivocal image and glory of God vulnerably embodied by the whole of Jesus only for relationship together. Indispensably throughout the incarnation, Christ’s function illuminated the whole knowledge and understanding of the qualitative image and relational likeness of God in which the human person and function were created; and by his qualitative-relational function between the manger and the cross, Christ also vulnerably demonstrates the ontological image and functional likeness to which human persons need to be restored for whole relationship together face to Face. Therefore, the relational dynamic of the image and glory of God is essential in Paul’s pleroma Christology for a third function fulfilled in the distinguished face of Christ necessary for relationship together:

 

  1. The qualitative image and relational likeness of the whole of God necessary for human ontology and function, as individual-person and collective-persons together in God’s family, in the same dynamic as Christ of nothing less and no substitutes (Christ the functional key).

 

Without Jesus’ whole person and function throughout the incarnation, whole knowledge and understanding of the image and glory of God would neither be illuminated for vulnerable self-disclosure in experiential truth, nor be definitive for vulnerable human reciprocal response in the image and likeness necessary for whole relationship together (2 Cor 3:18; Col 3:10). Our TA becomes constitutive only in the face of Christ and unmistakably distinguishes the human person only in Face-to-face-to-Face relationship together—the constitutive issue constituted.

            It is conclusive for theological anthropology that the person essential to God and distinguished in the Trinity is embodied by Jesus. Jesus’ whole person, as Paul made definitive theologically, is the exact and whole “image of God…in the vulnerably present and relationally involved face of Christ.” Jesus as person is not a referential concept or anthropomorphism imposed on him but his vulnerable function as “the image of the transcendent God…in his person all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell” (Col 1:15,19). His person as the image of God—along with the person of the Spirit, Jesus’ relational replacement (Jn 14:16-18; 16:13-15; 2 Cor 3:17-18)—is essential for the human person both to know the qualitative significance and to have whole understanding of what it means to be and function as the person created in the image of God. There are certainly irreducible differences between God as Creator and creatures. As Jesus vulnerably disclosed (e.g. in his formative family prayer, Jn 17:21-23), however, there is also an irreducible likeness between the persons of the Trinity and the human person created in the image of the whole of God (cf. Col 3:10; Eph 4:24). Anything less and any substitute of God or humans has been reduced. Therefore, as the Father tells us to “listen to my Son” (Mt 17:5), he also means to “listen and learn from him!”

            Any uncovering of theological anthropology that reveals a person in the unlikeness of God may not be surprising, since it will no doubt involve issues about relationship that are not accounted for in relational terms. For example, what is the significance of John 4:23-24 and how is this interrelated to the person in Matthew 15:8? The answers should be at the core of theological anthropology to distinguish the person. Here again, the nature and extent of our Christology is the key, which is why we need to pay close attention to and heed the whole of Jesus as the Father said (Mt 17:5, cf. Mk 4:24).

            Integral to the relational likeness of God is the qualitative image of God, and conversely. Since God transplanted the heart of his being to the innermost of the human person to connect with the whole-ly God (Ecc 3:11), the whole person can only be distinguished from inner out and just in relational terms (as in Jn 4:23-24). However, any shift of focus to outer in also shifts to referential terms, as in “these people draw near with their mouths...while their hearts are far from me” (Isa 29:13, cf. Mt15:8); and this is when relationship becomes a critical issue reflecting the unlikeness of God. The person (both Jesus’ and ours) in his call must be accounted for in whole relational terms or else reflect the unlikeness of God embodying the human image.

            The embodied Word relationally communicated the whole knowledge and understanding of God to make definitive the functional reality of God’s image and likeness (as Paul illuminated, 2 Cor 4:4,6), while also conclusively providing the epistemological clarification and hermeneutic correction of God’s unlikeness (as Paul reflected, 2 Cor 3:14-18). Jesus distinguished the relational likeness of God in two relational contexts: (1) within the whole of God, the Trinity, together with the persons of the Father and the Spirit, and (2) with other persons in a human context, whether together or not.

            In his vulnerable involvement of family love, Jesus confronted the relational human condition and restored persons (e.g. from reductionist human distinctions) to qualitative wholeness from inner out in relational terms in the relational likeness of the Trinity as God’s own family. This was demonstrated in his relational interactions, for example, with the Samaritan woman (Jn 4:7-26), Levi (Mk 2:13-17), Zacchaeus (Lk 19:1-10), the prostitute (Lk 7:36-50), Martha’s sister Mary (Lk 10:38-42), even including his mother Mary and beloved disciple John while on the cross (Jn 19:26-27)—making evident the qualitative innermost of the whole person in the qualitative image of God.

            The ontological One and the relational Whole, which is the Trinity, is what the whole of Jesus embodied in his life and practice throughout the incarnation. Though unique in function by their different roles in the whole of God’s thematic relational response to the human condition, what primarily defines their trinitarian persons are not these role distinctions. To define them by their roles is to define the trinitarian persons primarily by what they do, which would be a qualitative reduction of God to quantitative parts/aspects. This reduction makes role distinctions primary over the only purpose for their functional differences to love us vulnerably from top down, consequently reducing not only the qualitative substance of the Trinity but also the qualitative relational nature distinguishing God and its significance of what matters most to God, both as Creator and Savior.

            Accordingly, the image we embody composed by our different roles and related resources is always a human image, which no longer embodies God’s image and likeness. Such human images are also consequential for how we do our relationships, which no longer embodies the likeness of the Word’s (i.e. Trinity’s) family love. This image is at the heart of how our person functions, thus is inseparable from the who, what and how we are in everyday life—both our person individually and our persons together collectively.

            Therefore, our intimate relational involvement of family love signifies both the relational oneness with the Trinity in ongoing communion in the life of the triune God, and the relational and ontological oneness of God’s family as church living to be whole in likeness of the relational ontology of the Trinity. This is the oneness that fulfills Jesus’ definitive prayer for his family (Jn 17:20-26), which we cannot embody with anything less or any substitutes. Thus, this relational oneness is not about a structure of authority and roles, or a context determined by such distinctions, but oneness only from the function of relationships in the intimate relational process of family love. These ongoing dynamic relationships of family love, however, necessitate by its nature the qualitative innermost of God (Mt 5:8) and thus relationships only on God’s terms (Jn 14:21; 15:9-10; 17:17-19). Moreover, intimate communion with the whole-ly God cannot be based only on love, because God is holy—uncommon apart from the common. This relationship requires compatibility of qualitative innermost, and therefore the need for our transformation in order to have intimate relationship with the holy God. God’s love vulnerably from top down does not supersede this necessity, only provides for it. Further interrelated, the whole-ly God’s relational work of grace constitutes the redemptive reconciliation for our relationships in his family to be transformed to equalized and intimate relationships together necessary to be God’s whole on God’s whole relational terms, that is, in relational likeness of the whole and uncommon God

            On the one hand, Christians embodying human images can be subtle and elude awareness. This is directly connected to a lack of qualitative sensitivity, which results from self-consciousness operating over person-consciousness and thus displacing the qualitative image and relational likeness of whole-ly God. After all, “who told you that you were naked?”—which, for example, those dependent on social media need to face up to. On the other hand, this problem must not remain subtle or elusive if our person would embrace the image embodied by the Word (Col 1:15) and thereby vulnerably embody his integral likeness in reciprocal response face to face (2 Cor 4:6).

 

            In the narrative of your person, have you discovered the person that Job discovered about himself? Do you think that your person has been in your image or God’s? Who and what we are to define our human being and how we become to determine our being human, this is an ongoing constitutive issue that simply encompasses all our lives in the human context. The question always facing us in this issue is whether creation prevails or evolution further pervades; and the existential answer will always be evident in the function of our person(s).

            As the direct extension of the pivotal issue of listening, what’s at stake for this constitutive issue is immeasurable: all of our persons and our relationships to be whole and not fragmentary (“not to be apart”), thereby fulfilling our creation constitution and not our evolutionary potential, wherein we can enjoy the wholeness of reciprocal relationship together with the Trinity and with each other as family with satisfaction and without shame. Therefore, all Christians are accountable for their person to be congruent with the qualitative image of God and for their relationships to be reconciled in the relational likeness of the Trinity.

           

            Take heed: Our persons are irreducible and our relationships are nonnegotiable. A wider path is not an option, but we are all created with the free will to choose anything less for our person and any substitutes in our relationships.

 

 


 

[1] Various aspects of nonreductive physicalism are discussed in Malcolm Jeeves, ed., From Cells to Souls—and Beyond: Changing Portraits of Human Nature (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004).

[2] Further discussion on supervenience is found in Dennis Bielfeldt, “The Peril and Promise of Supervenience for Scientific-Theological Discussion,” and Niels Hendrik Gregersen, “God’s Public Traffic: Holist versus Physicalist Supervenience,” in Niels Henrik Gregersen, Willem B. Drees and Ulf Gorman, eds., The Human Person in Science and Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 117-188.

[3] For further deliberation, consider the recent experience of neurosurgeon Eben Alexander, Proof of Heaven: A Neurosurgeon’s Journey into the Afterlife (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2012).

[4] For what adds or subtracts in the gender equation, see Kary A. Kambara, The Gender Equation in Human Identity and Function: Examining Our Theology and Practice, and Their Essential Equation, (Gender Study, 2018). Online at http://www.4X12.org.

[5] Walter C. Kaiser Jr., Peter H. Davids, F. F. Bruce and Manfred T. Brauch, eds., Hard Sayings of the Bible (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1996), 93-94.

[6] See Thomas Kuhn’s discussion on the non-scientific influences shaping scientific theories, models and conclusions in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

[7] During his attempt to develop a “grand unified theory” (GUT), noted physicist Stephen Hawking gave up his quest for such a complete comprehensive theory for knowing the world in its innermost parts, because he concluded that this wasn’t possible with the limited framework of science—that a physical theory can only be self-referencing and therefore can only be either inconsistent or incomplete. Discussed in Hans Küng, The Beginning of All Things: Science and Religion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 15-24.

[8] Iain McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Modern World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).

[9] McGilchrist locates this shift in the prevailing activity of the left brain hemisphere and its dominance in shaping the modern world. The Master and His Emissary.

[10] Alan J. Torrance, “What is a Person?” in Malcolm Jeeves, ed., From Cells to Souls—and Beyond: Changing Portraits of Human Nature (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 209, 211.

 

 

 

© 2022 T. Dave Matsuo

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